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Abstract: Online social networks support a vibrant
ecosystem of third-party apps that get access to per-
sonal information of a large number of users. Despite
several recent high-profile incidents, methods to system-
atically detect data misuse by third-party apps on online
social networks are lacking. We propose CanaryTrap to
detect misuse of data shared with third-party apps. Ca-
naryTrap associates a honeytoken to a user account and
then monitors its unrecognized use via different channels
after sharing it with the third-party app. We design and
implement CanaryTrap to investigate misuse of data
shared with third-party apps on Facebook. Specifically,
we share the email address associated with a Facebook
account as a honeytoken by installing a third-party app.
We then monitor the received emails and use Facebook’s
ad transparency tool to detect any unrecognized use of
the shared honeytoken. Our deployment of CanaryTrap
to monitor 1,024 Facebook apps has uncovered multi-
ple cases of misuse of data shared with third-party apps
on Facebook including ransomware, spam, and targeted
advertising.
1 Introduction
Online social networks such as Facebook and Twit-
ter have millions of third-party applications (or apps)
on their platforms [20, 34]. These third-party apps
can potentially get access to billions of accounts in-
cluding personal information of users who install these
apps. For example, single sign-on (SSO) apps on Face-
book typically require access to a user’s email address,
date of birth, gender, and likes [15]. Third-party apps
with access to personal information of a large num-
ber of users have a high potential for misuse. There
have already been several high-profile incidents of data
misuse by third-party apps on online social networks
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[27, 28, 31, 32, 42, 64, 67, 68, 77, 80]. Most notably,
a personality quiz app “thisisyourdigitallife” harvested
data of an estimated 87 million Facebook users that was
then used by Cambridge Analytica to create targeted
advertising campaigns during the 2016 US presidential
election [31]. These incidents have invited scrutiny from
regulators. In July 2019, the FTC imposed sweeping
new privacy restrictions on Facebook [25], including a
mandate to suspend third-party apps that do not cer-
tify compliance with Facebook’s platform policies. How-
ever, the verification of these compliance certifications
has proven challenging for Facebook [28, 41, 64].
There is a lack of methods to systematically de-
tect data misuse by third-party apps. The main issue
is that online social networking platforms lose control
over their data once it is retrieved by third-party apps.
These third-party apps can store the retrieved data on
their servers from where it can be further transferred
to other entities. Neither users nor online social net-
works have any visibility on the use of data stored on
the servers of third-party apps. This makes the problem
of detecting data misuse extremely challenging since it
is hard to track something not under your control.
In this paper, we present CanaryTrap that uses hon-
eytokens to monitor misuse of data shared with third-
party apps on online social networks. A honeytoken
refers to a piece of information such as email address
or credit card information that can be intentionally
leaked or shared to detect its unrecognized (or poten-
tially unauthorized) use [59, 71, 76]. CanaryTrap shares
a honeytoken with a third-party app and detects its mis-
use using different monitoring channels. For example, if
an email address is shared as a honeytoken then received
emails act as the channel for detecting unrecognized use
of the shared email address.
We design and implement CanaryTrap to investi-
gate misuse of data shared with third-party apps on
Facebook. We share the email address associated with a
Facebook account as a honeytoken by installing a third-
party app and then monitor the received emails to de-
tect any unrecognized use of the shared email address.
We conclude that a honeytoken shared with a third-
party app has been potentially misused if the sender of
a received email cannot be recognized as the third-party
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app. In addition to using emails as a channel to detect
data misuse, we also leverage the fact that advertisers
on Facebook can use email addresses to target ads to
custom audiences [4]. Specifically, we use Facebook’s ad
transparency tool “Why Am I Seeing This?” to monitor
advertisers who have used the shared honeytoken (i.e.,
email address) to run custom audience ad campaigns on
Facebook [75]. We conclude that a honeytoken shared
with a third-party app has been potentially misused if
the advertiser cannot be recognized as the third-party
app.
There are two main challenges in scaling Canary-
Trap to monitor a large number of third-party apps that
exist on Facebook. First, we would need to create a Face-
book account using a unique email address per-app as a
honeytoken. It is infeasible to create a large number of
Facebook accounts because Facebook’s anti-abuse sys-
tems thwart bulk account registration [66]. To overcome
this challenge, we propose an array framework that ro-
tates email addresses associated with a Facebook ac-
count while maintaining a one-to-one mapping between
shared honeytokens (i.e., email addresses) and third-
party apps. Second, Facebook’s anti-abuse systems also
limit our ability to frequently rotate email addresses as-
sociated with a Facebook account. Thus, it is infeasi-
ble for us to rotate email addresses for each app as we
try to scale CanaryTrap to monitor a large number of
third-party apps on Facebook. We can install multiple
third-party apps on a Facebook account associated with
an email address; however, we would not be able to cor-
rectly attribute the third-party app responsible for data
misuse since the email address was shared with multiple
apps. To overcome this challenge, we propose a matrix
framework that uses an n × m matrix arrangement to
install nm apps across a pair of Facebook accounts by
rotating n + m email addresses. This matrix arrange-
ment allows us to attribute the responsible third-party
app by establishing a unique two-dimensional mapping
for each app.
We deploy array and matrix variants of Canary-
Trap to monitor misuse of data shared with 1,024 Face-
book third-party apps. We share honeytokens with these
apps using array and matrix frameworks and then mon-
itor the misuse through received emails over the du-
ration of more than a year. By analyzing the emails
received on the honeytoken email addresses, the array
framework detects 16 apps that share email addresses
with unrecognized senders. On the other hand, the ma-
trix framework detects 9 out of these 16 apps mainly
due to non-deterministic app behavior and implemen-
tation issues (which can be readily mitigated in future
deployments of CanaryTrap). By analyzing Facebook’s
ad transparency tool, while we are unable to attribute
the responsible apps because Facebook does not reveal
the email address used by advertisers, we are able to
detect unrecognized use of data by 9 advertisers.
Our further investigation reveals that Facebook
does not fully enforce its policies [9] that require app
developers to disclose their data collection and sharing
practices as well as respond to data deletion requests
by users. Of the analyzed apps, 6% apps fail to provide
the required privacy policies, 48% apps do not respond
to data deletion requests, and a few apps even continue
using user data after confirming data deletion.
2 Background & Related Work
2.1 Background
We briefly describe the privacy implications of making
user data accessible to third-party apps.
Third-party app ecosystem. Online social networks
provide APIs to enable the development of third-party
apps to enhance user experience (e.g., games, enter-
tainment, utilities). Popular online social networks such
as Facebook and Twitter have millions of third-party
apps that are used by hundreds of millions of users
[8, 20, 39]. For example, Facebook’s third-party apps
are being used by more than 42,000 of the top million
websites [40]. These third-party apps, with a very large
user base in the order of hundreds of millions of users,
get restricted access to their users’ accounts depending
on the permissions granted by the users. Third-party
apps can request permissions to retrieve user profile in-
formation such as their contact information (email ad-
dress, phone number) and demographics (date of birth,
age, gender, sexual orientation) as well as any con-
tent they or their friends/followers may have shared
(e.g., posts, likes, comments). While third-party apps
are supposed to request the minimal set of permissions
needed to implement their functionality, prior research
has shown that many third-party apps request more per-
missions than they actually need [33]. In fact, it is not
far fetched to assume that many apps request more per-
missions than necessary with malicious intent. In sum-
mary, third-party app access to personal information of
millions of users opens up possibilities for data misuse.
Despite its privacy risks, the third-party app ecosystem
also benefits users. For example, the integration of sin-
gle sign-on (SSO) features into websites expands users’
choices for authentication. Therefore, protecting users
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Fig. 1. Illustration of misuse of data shared with a third-
party Facebook app. User data stored on the app server can
be leaked to an attacker through unauthorized sale, sharing, or
accidental public exposure. The attacker can then misuse this
leaked data for various purposes such as marketing through
spam or targeted ad campaigns.
from data misuse is important for the growth of this
ecosystem.
Data leakage/misuse. Figure 1 illustrates how a
third-party app may engage in data misuse. Third-party
apps use the developer APIs (e.g., Facebook Graph
API) to retrieve data of users who install their apps.
The retrieved data is typically stored on the servers con-
trolled by third-party apps essentially providing them
perpetual access to the retrieved data. These apps can
then use the retrieved data to implement their function-
ality. For example, a music streaming app (e.g., Spo-
tify) can leverage the data to suggest relevant music or
allow users to share music with their friends or follow-
ers. It is noteworthy that the terms of service (TOS)
generally prohibit any use of the retrieved data outside
the scope of the third-party app [9]. Hence, third-party
apps should not leak users’ data intentionally (e.g., sell-
ing/sharing data to data brokers and advertisers) [64]
or inadvertently (e.g., accidentally making data pub-
licly available) [27]. Leaked data can be misused by an
attacker for sending spam emails or targeted ad cam-
paigns. We define misuse as any use of a user’s data,
which is retrieved by a third-party app, that is outside
the scope of the app.
Role of online social networks in curbing data
misuse. There have been several recent high-profile in-
cidents of misuse of data shared with third-party apps
[27, 31, 32, 42, 67, 68, 77, 80]. Most notably, a voter-
profiling company Cambridge Analytica reportedly used
a third-party app “thisisyourdigitallife” to harvest per-
sonal data (public and private profile information in-
cluding basic demographics, places visited, interests,
and friends) of more than 50 million Facebook users
[17, 31]. Data collected through third-party Facebook
apps containing user identifiers (user name, email ad-
dress, user ID) was even reportedly sold on a black
market [67]. These high-profile incidents of data mis-
use by third-party apps and pressure from regulators
has nudged Facebook to audit third-party apps on their
platform. Facebook recently curbed developer access to
user data and also started revoking access to dormant
APIs [29, 42, 54]. As a part of their recent settlement
with the FTC, Facebook now requires developers to an-
nually certify compliance with their TOS [25]. However,
the verification of these certifications has proven chal-
lenging for Facebook in the past [41, 64]. Thus, online
social networks need to proactively monitor third-party
apps on their platform for potential data misuse. Unfor-
tunately, online social network operators have skirted
their responsibility. For example, an ex-employee ac-
cused Facebook of intentionally limiting their audits of
data accessed by third-party apps unless there is neg-
ative press or pressure by regulators [48, 56]. The cal-
lous attitude of online social networks in protecting their
users’ data from third-party apps further highlights the
need for methods that can be independently deployed
to detect data misuse by third-party apps. However, the
unavailability of privileged information (e.g., API access
logs) and stringent crawling restrictions imposed by on-
line social networks limit the ability of independent re-
searchers and watchdogs to investigate the misuse of
data by third-party apps at a large scale.
2.2 Related Work
Detecting data leakage. A large body of prior work
has focused on detecting leakage of user data on the
client-side (e.g., mobile apps, web browsers) to online
trackers and advertisers [37, 38, 44, 46, 47, 49, 60–
63, 69, 72]. First, some prior work has focused on de-
tecting data leakage in mobile apps through network
traffic analysis [60–63, 69]. For example, Ren et al. [61]
showed that more than 50% of the 100 most popular mo-
bile apps leak personally identifiable information (PII).
Second, prior work has focused on detecting data leak-
age in web browsers through cookies, contact forms, or
emails [37, 38, 46, 49, 72]. For example, Starov et al. [72]
showed that more than 8% of websites leak users’ PII to
online trackers through contact forms. Finally, a subset
of prior work on detecting data leakage in web browsers
has focused on the leakage of user data by third-party
apps on online social networks [44, 47]. Huber et al. [44]
reported more than a hundred examples of PII (e.g.,
Facebook’s user ID and name) being leaked to analytics
services by third-party apps. This line of prior work has
two key limitations. First, it is limited to detecting data
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leakage on the client-side – it cannot detect data leak-
age on the server-side. Second, it is limited to detecting
data leakage – it cannot detect potential misuse of the
leaked data. In contrast to prior work on detecting data
leakage, we focus on the detection of data misuse by
third-party apps irrespective of whether it is leaked at
the client-side or server-side.
Honeypots. Prior work has used honeypots to investi-
gate reputation manipulation in online social networks
and account/website compromise. First, prior work has
used honeypots to monitor attackers’ interactions with
honeypots by leaking credentials [35, 39, 53]. For ex-
ample, Onaolapo et al. [53] leaked credentials of honey
email accounts to blackhat forums and paste sites and
monitored activities of attackers who accessed their
honey email accounts. Second, prior work has used hon-
eypots to monitor attacker interactions with honeypots
without explicitly handing over their access, such as by
purchasing fake followers on Facebook, Instagram, or
Twitter [36, 45, 74]. For example, DeKoven et al. [36]
purchased Instagram followers for honeypot accounts to
monitor the activities and infrastructure of spammers.
Honeytokens. Honeytoken is a specialized form of
honeypot which is typically a digital piece of informa-
tion (e.g., email address, credit card information) [59].
Honeytokens have been used in prior work to investi-
gate insider threats [30, 55, 70], phishing attacks [51],
and website compromise [35]. For example, Spitzner et
al. [70] discussed various kinds of honeytokens such as
creating a bogus medical record to detect unauthorized
access by employees. More recently, DeBlasio et al. [35]
used email address and password pair as a honeytoken
to detect website compromise. In a similar spirit, we are
interested in using honeytokens to detect misuse of data
shared with third-party apps in online social networks.
3 CanaryTrap
Prior work lacks systematic methods that can be used
by online social networks or independent watchdogs to
detect misuse of data shared with third-party apps.
Even though online social networking platforms such as
Facebook and Google have unrestricted access to their
internal logs, it is challenging for them to detect data
misuse by third-party apps because data leaves their
platform once a third-party app retrieves it through
the APIs. Online social networks can look for excessive
(or “anomalous”) API access patterns by third-party
apps but they have no visibility into how the data is
used by third-party apps once it leaves their premises.
Even though such privileged information (available ex-
clusively to online social networking platforms) can help
narrow down the potential misuses, it is desirable to
build methods that can be deployed by independent
watchdogs without needing cooperation from online so-
cial networks. Next, we explain the design and imple-
mentation of our proposed approach to this end.
3.1 Design
Overview. We introduce CanaryTrap, a honeytoken
based approach to detect misuse of data shared with
third-party apps on online social networks without need-
ing their cooperation. Inspired by prior research on hon-
eypots, CanaryTrap uses a honeytoken to detect mis-
use of data shared with third-party apps. A honeyto-
ken refers to a piece of information such as email ad-
dress or credit card information that can be intention-
ally leaked/shared to detect its unrecognized (or po-
tentially unauthorized) use [59]. CanaryTrap shares a
honeytoken with third-party apps and detects its mis-
use using different channels. For example, if an email
address is shared as a honeytoken to a third-party app
then the received emails act as the channel for detecting
unrecognized use of the shared email address. Canary-
Trap can detect misuse of data shared with a third-party
app on any platform (e.g., Facebook, Google) by asso-
ciating the honeytoken (e.g., email address) to a user
account on the platform and then sharing it with the
third-party app. Next, we explain the design of Canary-
Trap and then propose two implementation frameworks
that allow its deployment at scale.
Design Space. CanaryTrap relies on sharing a honey-
token in the data associated with an account that can
be used as a bait to trigger misuse. There are various
attributes in a user account including but not limited
to name, email address, date of birth, photos, timeline
posts, check-ins, phone number, and address that can
be used as honeytokens. The use of each of the afore-
mentioned attributes as a honeytoken has different pros
and cons. Below, we discuss the desirable properties in
a honeytoken to detect the misuse of data shared with
a third-party app.
1. Exploitability: The honeytoken must provide sub-
stantial value and incentives for exploitation.
2. Soundness: The honeytoken must allow setting up
channels that can be soundly monitored for misuse
detection.
3. Feasibility: The monitoring channels for the honey-
token must be feasible to set up at scale.
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Fig. 2. Overview of CanaryTrap: (left-to-right) CanaryTrap associates a honeytoken email address to a Facebook account and
then shared it with a third-party app. CanaryTrap then monitors the misuse of the shared honeytoken through two channels:
received emails and Facebook’s ad transparency tool.
4. Availability: The honeytoken must be commonly
available in the account information and also com-
monly requested by third-party apps.
While we considered various attributes, we ended up
selecting email address as our honeytoken since it best
satisfies the aforementioned properties. Next, we justify
our choice of email address as the honeytoken.
1) Email address is exploitable by an attacker since
it plays a crucial role in the misuse of data due to its
uniqueness and also allows the attacker to contact users
by sending out emails. Typically, online services includ-
ing websites, games, and software require users to asso-
ciate an email address with their accounts. Users tend
to use the same email address across different accounts
[52, 57]. Hence, email address has emerged as a univer-
sal identifier [22, 50, 65]. It also provides data brokers
and advertisers the opportunity to unify data acquired
on a user from multiple sources to increase its coverage.
Email address also allows an attacker to contact users
by sending them emails.
2) Email address allows us to set up sound channels
to monitor the misuse of data. We can set up our own
email server or we can partner with an email provider
to receive emails on the corresponding email address.
We can then analyze these emails to detect the misuse
of the email address shared with third-party apps.
3) Email address allows us to set up feasible chan-
nels in a large-scale controlled experiment. We can ac-
quire a large number of unique email addresses to mon-
itor millions of third-party apps. We can either set up
our own email server to create any number of email ac-
counts or we can partner with an email provider.
4) Email address is available in the account infor-
mation of most online platforms. It is also commonly
requested by third-party apps [79]. Moreover, email is
one of the few permissions that can be requested by
third-party apps on Facebook without requiring a re-
view [14].
3.2 Implementation
Next, we discuss CanaryTrap’s implementation to de-
tect misuse of data shared with third-party apps on
Facebook using email address as the honeytoken.
Sharing a honeytoken with a third-party app.We
create a fresh Facebook account to share an email ad-
dress as the honeytoken with a third-party app. We can
either partner with a major email provider [35, 53] or
set up our own server for email accounts. We assign an
email address to the Facebook account. We then share
the email address with the third-party app by installing
the third-party app. The third-party app is able to ac-
cess the email address using Facebook’s Graph API.
Monitoring Channels. We set up two channels to
monitor the misuse of the honeytoken shared with the
third-party app monitored by CanaryTrap. First, we use
received emails on the email account of the shared hon-
eytoken as a monitoring channel. We conclude that a
honeytoken shared with a third-party app has been po-
tentially misused if the sender of a received email can-
not be recognized as the third-party app. Second, we
use Facebook’s ad transparency tool “Why Am I See-
ing This?” [23, 75] as a monitoring channel. We moni-
tor whether advertisers use the shared email address to
target ads to Facebook custom audiences [4]. We con-
clude that a honeytoken shared with a third-party app
has been potentially misused if the advertiser cannot
be recognized as the third-party app. We explain this
process in detail below.
1) Detecting data misuse using received emails.
Given a received email and a third-party app (app’s
name and domain name) as input, we use keyword
matching to determine whether the sender of the email
is the input third-party app. To match an email with a
third-party app, we generate keywords using the app’s
name and its host website’s domain name. For an app’s
name, we start with its full name and create tokens of
the name if it is composed of multiple words. For ex-
ample, if the app name is “test application” we gener-
ate “test application”, “test”, and “application” as key-
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words. For the domain name, we use the complete do-
main name and also create tokens of domain levels, ex-
cluding TLDs (e.g., .com, .co, .co.uk). For example, if
the domain name is “subdomain.example.com” we cre-
ate “subdomain.example.com”, “subdomain”, and “ex-
ample” as keywords. We then search these keywords in
the header of the received email. Specifically, we search
for them in “from”, “reply-to”, “message-id”, and “sub-
ject” fields. If any of the keywords is found in any of
these fields, we label the email as recognized; otherwise,
we label the email as unrecognized. We also call the
sender of an unrecognized email as unrecognized sender.
The unrecognized sender can be a partner website or an
external service used by the app to send emails. There-
fore, we manually analyze the content of unrecognized
emails to further determine data misuse.
2) Detecting data misuse using Facebook’s ad trans-
parency tool. We identify the names of advertisers who
upload our shared honeytoken by crawling the ad-
vertiser information provided by Facebook’s ad trans-
parency tool [23, 75]. Specifically, Facebook’s ad trans-
parency tool provides a list of advertisers who uploaded
a list with an email address associated with a Facebook
account [78]. For each of the listed advertisers, we ex-
tract the advertiser’s name and its domain (if available)
listed on their Facebook page. We then match the adver-
tiser’s name and its domain against the app’s keywords
generated using the aforementioned keyword matching
process. If any of the keywords is matched with the
name of the advertiser, we label the advertiser as recog-
nized; otherwise, we label the advertiser as unrecognized.
We conclude that data has been potentially misused by
an unrecognized advertiser because Facebook’s ad trans-
parency tool provides the evidence that the email ad-
dress shared with the third-party app has been uploaded
by the unrecognized advertiser with Facebook.
Summary. Figure 2 provides an overview of Canary-
Trap to detect misuse of data shared with third-party
apps on Facebook. CanaryTrap uses a Facebook account
to share an email address as a honeytoken with a third-
party app. Misuse is detected using two channels: by
analyzing the received emails and the advertisers listed
by Facebook’s ad transparency tool.
3.3 Deployment
Since online platforms support a large number of third-
party apps, it is important that CanaryTrap’s deploy-
ment can scale. We face two challenges in scaling Ca-
naryTrap’s deployment on Facebook.
First, CanaryTrap requires creating a Facebook ac-
count to share a unique email address as a honeytoken
with a third-party app. Since Facebook’s anti-abuse sys-
tems thwart automated/manual bulk account registra-
tion [66], it is infeasible to create a large number of Face-
book accounts to monitor a large number of apps. To
overcome this challenge, we propose an array framework
that rotates multiple email addresses associated with a
Facebook account to maintain one-to-one mapping be-
tween the shared honeytokens (i.e., email addresses) and
third-party apps. Note that we can practically create as
many email accounts as necessary by setting up our own
email server as we discuss later in Section 4.1.
Second, Facebook’s anti-abuse systems also limit
our ability to frequently rotate the email address as-
sociated with a Facebook account. Thus, it is infeasible
for us to rotate email addresses for each app as we try to
scale CanaryTrap to monitor a large number of third-
party apps on Facebook. As an alternate, we can share
the same honeytoken to multiple third-party apps using
a single Facebook account. However, in case a third-
party app misuses our data, it would not be possible to
identify the responsible app since the email address was
shared with multiple apps. To overcome this challenge,
we propose a matrix arrangement to install n×m apps
across a pair of Facebook accounts by rotating n + m
email addresses. This matrix arrangement enables us to
attribute the responsible third-party app by establish-
ing a unique two-dimensional mapping for each app.
The matrix framework is more scalable than the ar-
ray framework. More specifically, the matrix framework
allows us to reuse a honeytoken for monitoring multiple
third-party apps. It is able to provide a unique app-to-
honeytoken mapping by sharing two honeytokens with
each app in a two-dimensional arrangement. It allows
CanaryTrap to monitor N apps using as little as 2
√
N
honeytokens, instead of needing N honeytokens in the
array framework implementation.
Next, we detail the deployment of CanaryTrap using
both array and matrix frameworks.
3.3.1 Array Framework
In the array framework, we install all third-party apps
on a single Facebook account such that a unique honey-
token (email address) is shared with each app. To this
end, we create a single Facebook account, A, and set up
different honeytoken email addresses for it, HTA.
F = {A} , HTA = {e1, e2, ..., en} , App = {a1, a2, ..., an}
We start by associating an email address ei from the
HTA to the Facebook account A and install a new app
ai. We then uninstall the app ai and remove the email
address ei. This ensures that the app ai is only shared
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a single honeytoken i.e., ei. We then repeat this process
for all of the apps in App such that the app ai is shared
with the honeytoken ei.
Since only the third-party app ai knows the email
address ei, any email received on ei is attributed to
the third-party app ai. Let’s assume that ei receives
k emails. We denote emails received by ei as Mailei =
{mail1,mail2, ...,mailk}. We then input each email from
Mailei and third-party app ai to the matching process
explained in Section 3.2 to check whether the email is
labeled as recognized or unrecognized. We say that an
app ai is responsible for the unrecognized use of honey-
token shared with it if one or more emails from Mailei
are labeled as unrecognized.
3.3.2 Matrix Framework
The matrix framework allows us to attribute the third-
party app responsible for the misuse while sharing a
honeytoken to multiple apps. To monitor N apps using
matrix framework, we require n andm honeytokens such
that N <= n × m. If N is a perfect square then n =
m =
√
N . If N is not a perfect square then n ≥ √n and
m ≥ √n and N < n×m.
To implement CanaryTrap using a 2-dimensional
matrix framework, we create two Facebook accounts, R
and C. Each account is associated with a set of unique
email addresses that will act as our honeytokens. We
share two unique email addresses with each third-party
app, one email address associated with the Facebook ac-
count R (row) and one email address associated with the
Facebook account C (column). Figure 3 shows the de-
ployment of CanaryTrap using two Facebook accounts
associated with n and m email addresses. This matrix
arrangement allows us to monitor data misuse by n×m
third-party apps using n+m honeytokens.
F = {R,C}
HTR = {r1, r2, ..., rm} HTC = {c1, c2, ..., cn}
App =
 a1,1 .. .. a1,n. . . .
am,1 .. .. am,n

We start setting up the matrix framework with
Facebook account R and associate one email address at
a time with the account and install all the apps assigned
to this honeytoken. This corresponds to installing all the
apps in a given row shown in Figure 3. We then remove
all of the installed apps and repeat this process for all
email addresses in HTR. We repeat the process for Face-
book account C and the email addresses in HTC . Once
this process is completed for account C, each app has
R
C
r1
c1
a11
c2 c3 cn
r2
r3
a12 a13 a1n
a21 a22 a23 a2n
a31 a32 a33 a3n
am1rm am1 am2 amnam3
Fig. 3. Illustration of the matrix arrangement used by Ca-
naryTrap. Two sets of email addresses ({r1, ..., rm} and
{c1, ..., cn}) are associated with two Facebook accounts (R
[row] and C [column]). While each honeytoken is shared with
multiple apps in the corresponding row or column, an app is
shared two honeytokens (one from row and one from column)
to create a unique two-dimensional mapping.
been shared two honeytokens, one from account R and
one from account C. Specifically, each app ai,j from App
has been shared exactly two email addresses ri and cj .
To correctly attribute an email to a third-party app,
we use the following insight. Any email received on
email account r1 can belong to any of n apps a1,j where
j ∈ {1, 2, ..., n} corresponding to its row in the matrix.
Similarly, any email received on email account c1 can
belong to any of m apps ai,1 where i ∈ {1, 2, ...,m} cor-
responding to its column in the matrix. Recall that each
third-party app ai,j is installed on two accounts R and
C, respectively, and is shared exactly two honeytokens
ri and cj . Hence, if a third-party app ai,j sends out any
email to their users, such an email would be received
by one honeytoken ri in HTR and one honeytoken cj
in HTC . Specifically, we collect all the emails received
by the pair of email addresses ri and cj assigned to an
app ai,j . If the sender of an email received at ri is the
same as the sender for an email at cj , we attribute the
email to the third-party app ai,j . We then input each of
these attributed emails and third-party app ai,j to the
process explained in Section 3.2 to check whether the
email is labeled as recognized or unrecognized.
Note that this attribution strategy is susceptible to
mistakes if a pair of apps send emails from the same
email address. To understand this issue, consider the
following scenario. Let’s assume that two apps a1,2 (that
has been shared honeytokens r1 and c2) and a3,1 (that
has been shared honeytokens r3 and c1) send emails
from the same email address. The emails from a1,2 and
a3,1 received at r1 and c1, respectively, will be incor-
rectly attributed to a1,1. Similarly, the emails from a1,2
and a3,1 received at c2 and r3, respectively, will be incor-
rectly attributed to a3,2. These emails are “conflicting”
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because they are attributed twice, i.e., once when they
are correctly attributed to their respective app and once
when they are incorrectly attributed to another app. We
exclude these conflicting emails to avoid mistakes which
can result in falsely labeling an email as unrecognized.
4 Results
In this section, we first explain our experiments to de-
ploy CanaryTrap to monitor 1,024 third-party apps on
Facebook. We then investigate cases of data misuse de-
tected by CanaryTrap by analyzing the received emails
and Facebook’s ad transparency tool. Finally, we evalu-
ate the effectiveness of CanaryTrap’s matrix framework
in detecting data misuse.
4.1 Experimental Setup
Identifying third-party apps. Since Facebook does
not provide an index of third-party apps,1 we use a
list of Facebook apps from prior research [40] that was
compiled by crawling the web. This list contains 43,332
host websites that integrate Facebook apps (e.g., SSO,
social plugins). By re-crawling these 43,332 host web-
sites, we find active Facebook apps on 25,800 websites
that request email address. We randomly select 1,024 of
these host websites that integrate Facebook apps to de-
ploy CanaryTrap for monitoring data misuse. Our ran-
dom selection includes different services such as music
streaming and news sites.
Setting up email honeytokens. The array frame-
work requires sharing one email honeytoken per app.
Thus, we need 1,024 honeytokens to monitor 1,024
third-party apps using the array framework. Matrix
framework requires sharing 2
√
mn honeytokens to mon-
itor mn apps. Thus, we need 64 honeytokens to monitor
1,024 third-party apps using the matrix framework. To
this end, we set up a .com email server and use a list
of popular names [21] to create email accounts using
the firstname-lastname@example.com template. For ex-
ample, if we have a first name “john” and last name
“doe”, we generate an email account with email address
“john-doe@example.com”.
Setting up Facebook accounts. We register three
fresh Facebook accounts in total: one Facebook account
A for the array framework and two Facebook accounts
R and C for the matrix framework. We set the privacy
settings of these accounts such that their personal in-
formation, including email addresses, remains private to
everyone except for the installed apps.
1 Facebook discontinued the app center [44]. It now only lists
game apps.
Login to Facebook Account
Associate Honeytoken to
Facebook Account
Share Honeytoken
to App
Open Host Website
Find / Click
Login Button
Install App
Uninstall App
Wait 15
minutes
App page
Host website
Email setting page
Fig. 4. Automated workflow of our CanaryTrap implementa-
tion to associate a Facebook account to honeytokens that are
then shared with third-party apps using the array and matrix
frameworks.
Workflow of sharing honeytokens with third-
party apps. We use Selenium to automate the process
of (1) associating honeytokens to Facebook accounts and
then (2) sharing honeytokens with Facebook apps. Our
implementation ensures that honeytokens are appropri-
ately rotated in the Facebook accounts and shared with
the aforementioned 1,024 Facebook apps using the array
and matrix frameworks. Figure 4 shows the workflow of
our implementation.
Associating honeytokens to a Facebook account: To
this end, we open the Facebook account’s email set-
tings page [11] to add the honeytoken email address to
the account and select it as the primary email address.
Note that a Facebook account can have multiple associ-
ated email addresses but only the primary email address
is accessible to an app. Both array and matrix frame-
work implementations require rotating email addresses
in Facebook accounts. Array framework requires rotat-
ing email addresses more frequently than the matrix
framework since the array framework has a one-to-one
mapping between a honeytoken and an app. More fre-
quent rotation of email addresses is challenging because
Facebook’s anti-abuse systems rate limit the addition of
email addresses to the account. In comparison to the ar-
ray framework, the matrix framework is more amenable
to operating under these rate limits.
Sharing honeytokens with Facebook apps: To this
end, we open the host website to install the app. The di-
verse user interfaces of host websites make it challenging
to automate the process of installing the Facebook app.
By surveying a sample of host websites, we design tem-
plates of regular expressions such as contains(@href,
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‘facebook’) and contains(@class, ‘login-fb’) to
find Facebook login buttons from DOM elements on the
host websites. We then look for Facebook login buttons
using a list of candidate URLs for each host website.
This list includes the host website’s landing page, host
website’s URL that has a Facebook app identified by
prior work [40], and URLs returned from Google search
by issuing a query of login/sign up pages for the host
website. We click on the buttons that match our tem-
plates of regular expressions on each candidate URL
page until we find a Facebook login button that redi-
rects to Facebook to install the app. After the app has
been successfully installed, we are redirected back to
the host website. Upon installation, the third-party app
can request our email address using Facebook’s Graph
API. We allow a grace period of 15 minutes to the app
for accessing our email address before uninstalling it
and installing the next app. We need to uninstall the
app before rotating the email address to avoid exposing
the new email address to the last app. We acknowledge
that we might miss potential misuse that will occur as
a result of additional interactions (e.g., completing user
registration) with the host website or if the app requests
our email address after it is uninstalled.
Deployment of CanaryTrap. Our implementation of
CanaryTrap associates Facebook accounts to honeyto-
kens that are then shared with 1,024 Facebook apps us-
ing the array and matrix frameworks around the same
time in December 2018. We manually eyeball screen-
shots of a sample of 100 apps to estimate the success
of installing Facebook apps and sharing honeytokens
with these apps. Specifically, we analyze two types of
screenshots after the app is installed into the Facebook
account. The first screenshot captures the Facebook ac-
count’s apps settings page to validate whether or not
the app has been installed. We miss the installation of
7% of apps. The second screenshot captures the cur-
rent state of the host website after the app has been
installed. Even if apps are successfully installed as indi-
cated by the first screenshot, we find that honeytokens
may not have been shared with some apps due to mul-
tiple reasons. First, we observe that the host website
of some apps after installation gives us various website
errors such as page not found (404) or service unavail-
able (503). The fraction of such errors is 6%. Second, we
observe that host websites of some apps require us to
complete additional steps (e.g., additional demographic
information) resulting in incomplete account registra-
tion on the host website. We estimate that the frac-
tion of incomplete account registration is 31%. For the
remaining apps, we can confidently say that the apps
have been installed and honeytokens have been shared
successfully.
4.2 Misuse Detection using Emails
We deploy CanaryTrap’s array framework to monitor
1,024 apps. We monitor them using email as the moni-
toring channel for more than a year to detect data mis-
use. We receive 12,704 emails on the email accounts as-
sociated with the honeytokens shared with 332 out of
1,024 monitored apps. Using the keyword matching pro-
cess explained in Section 3.2, 12,282 of the emails are
labeled as recognized while the remaining 422 emails are
labeled as unrecognized. These 12,282 recognized and 422
unrecognized emails are received on honeytokens shared
with 327 and 20 Facebook apps, respectively.
Next, we evaluate the accuracy of our keyword
matching process to label emails as recognized and un-
recognized. We then characterize the unrecognized use
of our honeytokens shared with the Facebook apps. Fi-
nally, we discuss the potential impact of the Facebook
apps that are responsible for the unrecognized use of
honeytokens shared with them.
4.2.1 Evaluating Recognized and Unrecognized
Emails
We manually analyze the 422 unrecognized emails and a
1% sample of recognized emails. Our results show that
we are able to match emails with apps with high preci-
sion. Specifically, none of the recognized emails are incor-
rectly labeled while only 69 unrecognized emails shared
with 4 apps are incorrectly labeled. The senders of these
incorrectly labeled emails are unrecognized because the
email addresses of these senders are from a different do-
main which does not match with the host website. In
the future, we can improve the accuracy of the match-
ing process by matching domain registrant information
of these domains with the host website since some apps
use a different domain as their email server. For exam-
ple, the host website rajkamalprakashan.com of an app
and their email server domain rajkamalbooks.in that
sends unrecognized emails both have the same domain
registrant information. We can also try matching the
destination URL of these domains with the host website
since some of these domains redirect to the host web-
site. For example, the domain getscoop.com that sends
unrecognized emails redirects to their app’s host website
ebooks.gramedia.com. As an alternative to matching
the email sender, our existing keyword matching pro-
cess could also search for keywords in the email’s body
to reduce these incorrectly labeled emails. However, we
decide not to search in the email’s body because it may
result in incorrect labeling of a large number of unrec-
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ognized emails as recognized due to the occurrence of
commonly used words (e.g., application, game) in the
email’s content.
4.2.2 Characterizing Unrecognized Emails
We characterize the unrecognized use of the honeytoken
shared with 16 apps by (1) uncovering the relationship
between the unrecognized sender and the app through a
disclosure test and (2) analyzing the content of the un-
recognized emails. This characterization helps us devise
a taxonomy that determines the severity of the potential
misuse of the honeytoken.
Disclosure test. Our disclosure test checks whether
the relationship between the unrecognized sender of
an unrecognized email and app is disclosed or un-
known. This test includes any disclosure of the rela-
tionship between the unrecognized sender and the app
on the host website’s landing page, terms, privacy pol-
icy, and social media pages. If we find any disclo-
sure through this test, we say that the relationship
between the app and the unrecognized sender is dis-
closed, otherwise, it is unknown. For example, we re-
ceive emails that contain property listings from an un-
recognized sender dotpropertygroup.com on the hon-
eytoken shared with the “Thailand Property Login”
app. Through the disclosure test, we identify a dis-
closed relationship between the “Thailand Property Lo-
gin” app and dotpropertygroup.com on the landing
page of the app’s host website. In case of a disclosed
relationship, the unrecognized senders are typically a
partner/affiliate website, an external service (e.g., user
authentication service), or a company that acquired the
Facebook app. In case of an unknown relationship, the
unrecognized senders potentially get access to the user’s
data through breaches or leakages on the app’s servers
[27] or secret data sharing deals between apps and un-
recognized entities. We acknowledge that an app is not
culpable if it legitimately shares an email address with
an external service (e.g., a bulk email service) and the
external service accidentally or deliberately leaks the
email address to an unrecognized sender. Out of the 16
apps, we find that 9 apps have a disclosed relationship
with the unrecognized senders while the remaining 7
apps have an unknown relationship.
Content analysis.We manually analyze the content of
the 353 unrecognized emails received from the unknown
and disclosed senders and label them to either (1) “Ma-
licious”, (2) “Unrelated”, and (3) “Functional”. We label
an unrecognized email as malicious if the content of the
email is clearly spam or scam. We identify 76 malicious
emails received on the honeytokens shared with 3 apps.
Some examples of malicious content include ransomware
scam [24] or Viagra spam [2]. We label an unrecognized
email as “unrelated” if the content of the email is not
relevant to either the app or the app’s host website. We
identify 79 unrelated emails received on the honeytokens
shared with 9 apps. Some examples of unrelated content
include promotional offers, links to product listings, and
newsletters. Note that an unrelated email may be in vi-
olation of Facebook’s TOS [9] if the app has not clearly
notified the user about data usage by other entities in
their privacy policy. We label the content of an unrec-
ognized email as “functional” if it is related to the core
functionality of the app or the app’s host website. We
identify 198 functional emails received on the honeyto-
kens shared with 4 apps.
Figure 5 shows the recognized emails and unrecog-
nized emails labeled as either malicious, unrelated, or
functional received on the honeytokens shared with 16
Facebook apps from disclosed and unknown senders.
Next, we discuss the taxonomy of the unrecognized use
of our shared honeytokens based on the disclosure test
and the content analysis.
1) Malicious Content & Unknown Relationship.
This type of unrecognized use is the most egregious
case of data misuse since the user data has been ob-
tained by spammers or scammers who are sending mali-
cious emails. Note that we only receive malicious emails
from unknown senders. Specifically, we received 76 ma-
licious emails on honeytokens shared with 3 apps from
unknown senders indicated by red cross markers in Fig-
ure 5. Out of these 3 apps, the honeytokens shared with
2 apps “Safexbikes Motorcycle Superstore” and “Printi
BR API” receive a ransomware scam email [24]. This
email asks for ransom through bitcoin falsely claiming
that the victim’s browsing history has been compro-
mised. The honeytoken shared with the remaining one
app “WeWanted” has received a large number of spam
emails such as Viagra spam. We also find anecdotal ev-
idence of the potential breaches of the host websites of
the two apps “Safexbikes Motorcycle Superstore” and
“Printi BR API” [18, 26]. We surmise that the attack-
ers likely acquired our honeytoken due to either unin-
tended exposure or breach of these app’s server. To date,
we have not received any disclosure from any of these
apps’ host websites about a data breach. We believe that
CanaryTrap can help detect such cases of data misuse
where users’ data shared with Facebook apps are ob-
tained by spammers or scammers.
2) Unrelated Content & Unknown Relationship.
While the content is not malicious, this type of unrecog-
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Fig. 5. Our deployment of CanaryTrap’s array framework on Facebook using emails as a monitoring channel for more than a
year uncovers 16 cases of unrecognized use of data by apps. For example, the email accounts of the honeytokens shared with
“Safexbikes Motorcycle Superstore” app and “Printi BR API” app each receive an unrecognized email that asks for ransom
through bitcoin falsely claiming that the victim’s browsing history has been compromised.
nized use is worrisome for users since user data shared
with Facebook apps have been potentially misused by
an unknown entity. We receive 9 unrelated emails on
honeytokens shared with 4 apps from unknown senders
indicated by blue plus markers in Figure 5. By analyz-
ing the privacy policy of these 4 apps, we find that only
1 app (“NYX ca”) explicitly mentions the potential use
of data by affiliate partners. For the remaining 3 apps,
these unrecognized emails are clearly data misuse since
1 app (“MyJapanBox”) does not have a privacy pol-
icy while other 2 apps (“PopJulia”, “JustFashionNow”)
do not explicitly mention potential use of user data by
other entities. We believe that CanaryTrap can help de-
tect such cases of misuse where data shared with Face-
book apps have been sold or transferred to unknown
entities.
3) Unrelated Content & Disclosed Relationship. An
unrelated email from a disclosed sender appears less
worrisome for users as compared to an unrelated email
from an unknown sender. Yet, we argue that our hon-
eytokens shared with the Facebook apps have been po-
tentially misused by the unrecognized senders to send
emails not relevant to the app (which may also be in
violation of Facebook’s TOS [9]). We receive 70 unre-
lated emails on honeytokens shared with 5 apps from
disclosed senders indicated by orange diamond markers
in Figure 5.
4) Functional Content & Disclosed Relationship.
This type of unrecognized use typically occurs when
a Facebook app is using a partner website or an ex-
App Name Host Global Country
Website Alexa Alexa
Rank Rank
Safexbikes Motor safexbikes 89K 8K (IN)
cycle Superstore .com
WeWanted wewanted.com.tw 99K -
Printi BR API printi.com.br 15K 441(BR)
JustFashionNow justfashionnow.com 51K 223 (MO)
PopJulia popjulia.com 469K
MyJapanBox myjapanbox.com 766K -
Nyx CA nyxcosmetics.ca 258K 16K (CA)
Tom’s Hardware tomshardware 870 726 (USA)
Guide-IT Pro .com
Alex’s first app beautymaker.com.sg 680K 3K (SG)
Thailand Pro- thailand-pr- 98K 3K (TH)
perty Login operty.com
Hop-On, hop-on-hop 161K 77K (USA)
Hop-Off -off-bus.com
Leiturinha leiturinha.com.br 114K 5K (BR)
The Breast Expa bestoryclub 484K -
nsion Story Club .com
Jacky’s Electronics jackyselectronics 517K 8K (UAE)
.com
Berrykitchen.com Berrykitchen.com 494K -
uCoz.es Login ucoz.es 157K -
Table 1. Popularity of 16 Facebook apps that are responsible
for the unrecognized use of the shared honeytokens.
ternal service (e.g., a user authentication system) to
send emails to their users. We receive all 198 functional
emails on honeytokens shared with 4 apps from disclosed
senders indicated by grey square markers in Figure 5.
Facebook’s TOS [9] permits the sharing of data with
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partner websites or external services if they use it to pro-
vide services within the app. Hence, we do not consider
these functional emails as a misuse of our honeytoken.
4.2.3 Potential Impact
Table 1 lists the 16 apps that are responsible for the un-
recognized use of our honeytoken along with the global
and country-level Alexa rankings of their host websites.
While the global rank of their host websites ranges be-
tween 870 and 766K, half of them are ranked among
the top 10K at the country-level. Therefore, we argue
that unrecognized use of data by these apps on popular
websites potentially impacts a large number of users.
For example, according to Alexa, the host website of
“Tom’s Hardware Guide-IT Pro” app has more than 10
million unique monthly visitors.
4.3 Misuse Detection Using Facebook’s
Ad Transparency Tool
CanaryTrap also uses Facebook’s ad transparency tool
[75] as the monitoring channel to detect potential mis-
use of data shared with Facebook apps. Facebook’s ad
transparency tool enables CanaryTrap to identify the
apps whose shared honeytoken email addresses were up-
loaded to Facebook for ad targeting [4]. To this end, we
took 34 snapshots of the advertisers listed by Facebook’s
ad transparency tool over the period of one month. We
are able to identify 47 unique advertisers that uploaded
our honeytoken email address for ad targeting. Unfor-
tunately, Facebook’s ad transparency tool only provides
the names of the advertisers but not the email ad-
dress uploaded by the advertisers. Thus, we cannot at-
tribute the responsible apps since the Facebook account
has been associated with multiple honeytoken email ad-
dresses. 2
While we cannot attribute the responsible Facebook
app, we can still detect whether any of our shared hon-
eytokens has been potentially misused by advertisers.
To this end, we match 47 advertisers’ names and do-
mains with each of the 1,024 apps using the process
explained in Section 3.2. Out of these 47 advertisers, 38
advertisers are recognized while the remaining 9 adver-
tisers are unrecognized. We further evaluate the accu-
racy of our labeling of advertisers as recognized or un-
2 We could generate a mapping between apps and advertisers
by capturing a snapshot of advertisers after rotating an email
address and installing a new app. However, if we observe an un-
recognized advertiser after installing a new app, it is not possible
to distinguish whether the current app leaked our honeytoken
or another previously installed app leaked it.
recognized through manual inspection. For a recognized
advertiser, we visit the Facebook page and web page of
the advertiser and compare it against the matched app.
For an unrecognized advertiser, we visit the Facebook
page and web page of the advertiser and then compare
it against each Facebook app to check whether there
is any potential relationship between an app and the
advertiser. Our manual inspection shows that we label
advertisers as recognized and unrecognized without any
mistakes. Overall, our results show that Facebook’s ad
transparency tool can also be leveraged to detect poten-
tial misuse of data shared with Facebook apps.
While the limited information provided by Face-
book’s ad transparency tool does not allow Canary-
Trap’s current implementation to identify the Facebook
apps responsible for the misuse, a modified implementa-
tion of CanaryTrap can address this limitation. Specif-
ically, CanaryTrap would be able to correctly attribute
the app behind leaking our honeytoken to the adver-
tiser if we created Facebook accounts on a per-app basis.
Note that we do not create a separate Facebook account
for each of the 1,024 apps monitored in our array frame-
work because of Facebook’s stringent countermeasures
against bulk account creation [66].
4.4 Evaluation of Matrix Framework
Next, we analyze the matrix framework’s effectiveness in
attributing third-party apps to received emails and de-
tecting data misuse. CanaryTrap’s matrix framework is
deployed to share email honeytokens to the same 1,024
apps around the same time frame. Thus, we can use the
array framework as ground truth to evaluate the accu-
racy of the matrix framework. Since the matrix frame-
work shares an email honeytoken with multiple apps
and two email honeytokens are shared with each app,
we first need to attribute the received emails to the right
apps. After attributing the responsible apps, we then
use the same process as the array framework to label
the received emails as recognized or unrecognized.
Attribution.We receive a total of 23,303 emails on the
email accounts associated with the two Facebook ac-
counts R and C of the matrix framework. Out of these
23,303 emails, we receive 11,370 emails on the email
accounts associated with the Facebook account R and
11,933 emails on the email accounts associated with the
Facebook account C. For attributing these 23,303 emails
to 1,024 apps, using the process described in Section 3.3,
we check whether the emails received on the email ac-
counts of the two honeytokens shared with an app are
from the same sender. We are able to attribute 20,867
emails to 279 apps while 12 emails are excluded be-
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cause they are conflicting. Next, we analyze the remain-
ing 2,424 unattributed emails.
To help understand the limitations of the matrix
framework’s attribution approach, we attempt to at-
tribute the 2,424 unattributed emails using the follow-
ing 3-step process. First, we leverage the array frame-
work to generate a sender-to-app mapping between a
Facebook app and the emails received on its associated
email account. Note that this mapping is only avail-
able because the array and matrix frameworks are si-
multaneously deployed. Thus, we would not have this
information for validation if the matrix framework was
deployed standalone. The sender-to-app mapping from
the array framework allows us to attribute 1,972 emails
to 59 apps. Second, we use the keyword matching pro-
cess detailed in Section 3.2 to attribute the remaining
452 unattributed emails to apps. We use the intuition
that the keyword matching process labels an email as
recognized if it is received from the app itself. Hence, we
attribute an email to an app if the email is labeled as
recognized against the app. This matching process al-
lows us to attribute 282 emails to 25 apps. Finally, we
rely on manual eyeball analysis to attribute the remain-
ing 170 emails to 3 apps. These apps are not attributed
by the previous two steps because these apps either sent
us unrecognized emails or they show non-deterministic
behavior as discussed below. Overall, we are able to at-
tribute the 2,424 unattributed emails to 82 unique apps
using this 3-step process.
Next, we manually analyze our logs (including
screenshots) collected during CanaryTrap’s automated
workflow (shown in Figure 4) to understand the root
cause of unattributed emails in the matrix framework.
We identify two main reasons. First, we find that 25
apps are unattributed because only one of the two hon-
eytokens associated with either Facebook account R
or Facebook account C was successfully shared due to
implementation issues. While our automation is gen-
erally robust, some unhandled errors occurred due to
unexpected changes in Facebook’s or the host site’s
web interface. Second, we find that the 57 apps are
unattributed due to non-deterministic app behavior de-
spite successfully sharing honeytokens with these apps.
Recall that the attribution requires that an app sends
the same email on the email accounts of both honeyto-
kens shared with the app and the sender’s email address
of both these emails are also the same. We find that 50
out of these 57 apps remain unattributed because these
apps fail to send emails on the email accounts of one of
the two honeytokens shared with the app. The remain-
ing 7 apps are unattributed because these apps send
the same emails using different email addresses on the
two honeytokens shared with the app. The unattributed
apps due to the non-deterministic app behavior also in-
dicate a limitation of the matrix framework to detect
some cases of data misuse. As we also show later, the
matrix framework is unable to detect misuse (i.e., false
negatives) if an attacker sends emails using two different
email addresses on the email accounts of both honeyto-
kens shared with the app.
Accuracy of misuse detection. Next, we use the
process explained in Section 3.2 to label the 20,358
emails as recognized and 509 emails as unrecognized.
The 509 emails labeled as unrecognized are attributed to
9 Facebook apps. We evaluate the matrix framework’s
data misuse detection accuracy using the array frame-
work as ground truth because it does not have the is-
sue of unattributed apps due to its one-to-one app-to-
honeytoken mapping. Using this ground truth, we define
the following: (1) true positive is an app labeled as un-
recognized by both matrix and array frameworks; (2)
true negative is an app labeled as recognized by both
matrix and array frameworks; (3) false negative is an
app labeled as recognized by the matrix framework but
labeled as unrecognized by the array framework; and (4)
false positive is an app labeled as unrecognized by the
matrix framework but labeled as recognized by the array
framework.
For the 1,024 monitored apps, the matrix frame-
work has 9 true positives and 1,008 true negatives. Our
results show that the matrix framework is able to detect
most of the unrecognized apps while correctly labeling
all of the apps as recognized. Our matrix framework has
no false positives and 7 false negatives. Out of these 7
false negatives, one app is unattributed due to imple-
mentation issues, 5 apps are unattributed due to a non-
deterministic behavior of these apps, and the remaining
one app is unattributed due to conflicting emails dis-
cussed in Section 3.3. A robust implementation of our
automated workflow (Figure 4) that handles more cor-
ner cases and unexpected errors can reduce unattributed
apps. We can also apply ideas from error correction to
the matrix framework by sharing honeytokens to apps in
rows and columns (as shown in Figure 3) redundantly.
This redundancy can help us reduce the likelihood of
unattributed apps similar to prior literature on encod-
ing messages using error correction codes [43].
Overall, our results highlight a trade-off between ac-
curacy and scalability – the matrix framework is less
accurate but more scalable than the array framework if
email addresses rotation is a bottleneck.
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5 Discussions & Limitations
5.1 Data Deletion by Third-party Apps
Facebook users have a limited recourse of action to exer-
cise control over the data that is retrieved by third-party
apps. Facebook provides users the option to uninstall
the app but this will only prevent the app from accessing
user data in the future. Note that user data already re-
trieved by an app, before app uninstallation, may still be
stored on the app’s server. After uninstalling an app, the
user can request the app to delete their data [3]. Face-
book recommends app developers to implement a one-
click data deletion request callback [5]. Unfortunately,
third-party apps currently do not implement the recom-
mended data deletion request callback. As an alternate,
Facebook suggests users to contact the app developer
on their own by typically pointing them to the app’s
privacy policy. Facebook’s TOS require app developers
to honor their users’ data deletion requests [9]. Next, we
investigate the process of requesting third-party Face-
book apps to delete user data and also evaluate its ef-
fectiveness.
Contacting app developers. To evaluate the effec-
tiveness of the data deletion request process, we conduct
a follow-up experiment where we contact third-party
app developers and ask them to delete our data (includ-
ing honeytoken email addresses) shared with these apps.
To this end, we sample 100 apps out of the 332 apps in-
stalled in the array framework that sent us at least one
email. Note that sampling from these 332 apps ensures
that our data has been stored by these apps since we
receive one or more emails from them. We gather the
contact URLs provided by these apps to users upon in-
stallation. We then open the contact URLs provided by
these apps and manually analyze them to identify de-
veloper contact information, which is typically a contact
email or contact form. Out of the 100 apps, we find that
87 apps provide a contact email while the remaining 13
apps provide a contact form. We then contact the app
developers to delete the data retrieved from our Face-
book account, including the honeytoken email address.
Specifically, we email the data deletion requests to the
email address provided by 87 apps and submit the data
deletion requests through the contact forms of the re-
maining 13 apps. Out of the 87 contact emails, our email
server is able to successfully send emails on 80 while the
remaining 7 emails failed due to delivery errors. Out of
the 13 contact forms, we are able to successfully submit
7 contact forms, while the submission of the remaining
6 contact forms failed due to website errors. In total,
Requested data deletion successfully 87 apps
Not responded 42 apps
Responded 45 apps
Acknowledged data deletion 29 apps
Send email(s) after acknowledging data deletion 13 apps
Table 2. Our results show that the process of contacting
Facebook apps to request data deletion is mostly ineffective.
Approximately only half of the Facebook apps responded back
to our request. 13 Facebook apps even send us one or more
emails despite acknowledging that they deleted our data.
we are able to successfully contact 87 apps through the
contact email or the contact form.
Response by app developers. We contacted these
100 app developers in April 2019 and waited over a
month to give them sufficient time to respond to our
data deletion requests. Table 2 summarizes our results.
Only 52% of the apps (45 out of 87) responded back to
our requests while the remaining 48% of apps (42 out
of 87) did not respond. We manually analyze these re-
sponses to check whether or not these apps confirm data
deletion. Out of these 45 apps that responded, only 29
acknowledged that they have deleted our data (or can-
celed our user account). The remaining 16 apps either
forwarded our requests to relevant persons in their re-
spective organizations, request additional steps on our
part such as removing the account from the app’s asso-
ciated host website, or deny storing any data retrieved
through the Facebook app.
We also continue to monitor emails received from
these 87 apps to check whether they keep using our
data despite our deletion request. We receive at least
one email from 49 out of these 87 apps after submission
of our data deletion request. It is noteworthy that 13 of
these 49 apps earlier confirmed that they have deleted
our data. Our analysis of contacting developers to re-
quest data deletion raises two key issues.
First, we note that the process to request data dele-
tion is hard to navigate for a lay user. Facebook cur-
rently does not play any active part in the data deletion
process. Facebook completely relies on third-party app
developers to fulfill users’ data deletion requests. Users
have to go through a cumbersome process of finding
ways to contact app developers, which typically entails
reading a long privacy policy on the app’s host website
to find the contact information. Even when a user is
able to successfully contact the app developer despite
these challenges, our results show that many apps re-
quire significant back-and-forth communication which
further complicates this process for a lay user. We ar-
gue that Facebook should (at the very least) mandate
the developers to implement data deletion request call-
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back [5] into their apps. This would not only provide
a user-friendly mechanism for requesting data deletion
but also help Facebook audit compliance of Facebook’s
TOS by third-party apps.
Second, we note that the process of contacting Face-
book apps is mostly ineffective. Our results show that
approximately half of the Facebook apps respond back
to our data deletion requests. Out of the apps that re-
spond to our requests, less than two thirds of them ac-
knowledge that they have deleted user data. Even when
the apps acknowledge that they have deleted user data,
there is no way to guarantee that our data has been
actually removed. In fact, we continue to receive emails
from 13 apps that earlier confirmed our data has been
deleted. We believe that CanaryTrap can help Facebook
detect such cases.
5.2 Lack of Enforcement by Facebook
We observe several instances of lack of enforcement of
existing Facebook’s developer policies. Facebook’s TOS
require third-party apps to provide a privacy policy that
explains the collection and use of data [9]. Out of the
1,024 Facebook apps analyzed in our experiments, 6%
apps (62 out of 1,024) do not provide a privacy pol-
icy. For the remaining 94% apps that do have a pri-
vacy policy, we note that many apps use cookie-cutter
policies that do not comply with Facebook’s TOS. For
instance, Facebook requires an app’s privacy policy to
clearly explain how users can request the deletion of
their data. We find that the privacy policies of many
apps do not provide this information. We argue that
Facebook should more strictly enforce these policies. It
is noteworthy that even when apps provide a compliant
privacy policy, Facebook does not have a sound mecha-
nism to check whether the apps are actually in compli-
ance. Facebook currently relies on certification of TOS
compliance by third-party app developers as well as a
mandatory compliance audit of the app’s infrastructure
by Facebook or an independent auditor [9]. However,
neither Facebook can actually verify the authenticity
of these certifications of compliance (as shown by the
Cambridge Analytica episode [41]) nor Facebook can
mandate a compliance audit (e.g., [64]) to detect po-
tential violations. We believe that CanaryTrap can help
Facebook detect such violations of its TOS.
5.3 Limitations and Future Extensions
Random emails. Due to the low cost of mass email
spam, spammers send emails to email servers randomly
by creating arbitrary email addresses [58, 73]. It is pos-
sible that a spammer may end up sending an email to
one of the honeytokens used by CanaryTrap. To avoid
incorrect misuse detection in this case, our email server
tries to exclude such emails by using a catch-all email
account [19]. Specifically, our catch-all email account re-
ceives all emails sent to incorrect email addresses on the
email server that do not exist. This catch-all email ac-
count acts as a control account to eliminate such random
emails from spammers. Note that our catch-all email ac-
count did not receive any spam during our experiments.
Use of other email service providers. Using our
custom domain for creating email accounts may result in
false negatives. First, it is possible that the attacker may
not be interested in our honeytoken (that uses our cus-
tom domain) due to its lack of established reputation.
Second, an attacker aware of CanaryTrap’s deployment
may try to detect and exclude the honeytoken email
addresses of domains that are known to deploy Canary-
Trap. We argue that partnerships with popular email
providers can address these issues.
Other honeytokens and monitoring channels. We
acknowledge that our implementation of CanaryTrap
would not detect misuse of data shared with third-
party apps if their behavior is not observable through
the honeytoken and monitoring channels that are cur-
rently used. CanaryTrap’s current implementation is
limited to email address as the honeytoken and two
monitoring channels (received emails and Facebook’s
ad transparency tool). Future improvements to Canary-
Trap should explore using other honeytokens and mon-
itoring channels. First, CanaryTrap can be extended to
use other profile attributes such as location, gender, and
date of birth as honeytokens. However, it is challenging
to detect the misuse of these attributes due to a lack
of sound monitoring channels. Second, CanaryTrap can
be extended to use other monitoring channels to de-
tect misuse of honeytokens. For example, CanaryTrap’s
existing monitoring channels cannot detect the misuse
when an attacker uses a honeytoken as an identifier to
link with other data sources. One example of such an at-
tacker could be data brokers who typically gather infor-
mation on unique identifiers including email addresses
from various sources such as trackers, advertisers, or
other partners. Future work can consider periodically
querying data broker APIs [1, 6] as a monitoring chan-
nel. We could not use data brokers in our experiments
because most of them have proprietary APIs that are
not openly available to researchers.
Scaling CanaryTrap. We can reduce the number of
required honeytokens by using higher-dimensional ten-
sor frameworks. As discussed earlier, a 1-dimensional
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(array) framework requires N honeytokens while a 2-
dimensional (matrix) framework requires 2 × 2√N hon-
eytokens to monitor N apps. Likewise, an n-dimensional
framework would require only n × n√N honeytokens to
monitor N apps. Thus, as we increase dimensions from
1 to 2 to monitor N = 1, 000, 000 apps, we can reduce
honeytokens from N = 1, 000, 000 to 2 × 2√N = 2, 000.
However, there is a trade-off between scalability (i.e., re-
ducing the number of honeytokens) and accuracy (i.e.,
false negatives due to the non-deterministic app behav-
ior discussed in Section 4.4).
We denote the probability that a honeytoken shared
with an app does not receive a target email due to the
non-deterministic behavior as P (hti). Let’s assume an
arbitrary probability P (hti) = . In the case of a 1-
dimensional framework, we share one honeytoken with
an app. Hence, the probability that we do not receive
the target email on the shared honeytoken due to the
non-deterministic behavior will be . In the case of an n-
dimensional framework, we share exactly n honeytokens
with an app. Assuming independence, the probability
that we do not receive an email on one of the n honey-
tokens will be [P (ht1)∨P (ht2)∨...∨P (htn)] = 1−(1−)n.
Since we cannot attribute the target email to its app if
any of the n honeytokens do not receive the email, the
probability of unattributed apps using an n-dimensional
framework will be 1− (1− )n. Thus, the probability of
unattributed apps increases at higher dimensions.
Data misuse on other platforms. CanaryTrap can
be adapted to detect misuse of data shared with third-
party apps on other social networking platforms such
as Twitter [7], Instagram [13], and Snapchat [16] as
well as other online platforms that support third-party
apps [10, 12]. It is noteworthy that the underlying
methodology of CanaryTrap remains the same to mon-
itor apps on other platforms. We only need to mod-
ify some parts of CanaryTrap’s existing implementation
while we can still reuse various parts. For example, Ca-
naryTrap can be adapted to monitor third-party apps
on Twitter by modifying the existing implementation to
associate a honeytoken to a Twitter account instead of a
Facebook account and the automation of host websites
to install twitter apps instead of Facebook apps. We can
reuse the existing infrastructure to monitor apps once
the honeytoken has been shared with a third-party app.
For example, we can continue using our email server to
monitor data misuse through received emails. Nonethe-
less, the feasibility of reusing a monitoring channel may
vary. For example, the ad transparency tool is available
on Facebook but not on Twitter.
6 Conclusion
Third-party apps on online social networks with access
to users’ personal information pose a serious privacy
threat. A slew of recent high-profile scandals demon-
strate that third-party apps are being exploited to har-
vest and misuse data of millions of users. We presented
CanaryTrap to help independent watchdogs detect mis-
use of data shared with third-party apps without need-
ing cooperation from online social networks. Our de-
ployment of CanaryTrap uncovered several cases of mis-
use of data shared with third-party apps on Facebook
including ransomware, spam, and targeted advertising.
Our results also demonstrated that Facebook does not
fully enforce its TOS as many apps do not disclose their
data sharing practices or honor data deletion requests
by users. A larger-scale longitudinal deployment of Ca-
naryTrap can potentially uncover previously undetected
cases of misuse of data shared with third-party apps on
Facebook as well as other online social networking plat-
forms.
Last but not least, we discuss the ethical considera-
tions associated with our study. We did not seek the con-
sent from Facebook or the third-party apps monitored in
our study because it could potentially threaten the va-
lidity of our findings. The small number of Facebook ac-
counts and automated crawlers used in our study posed
only modest overheads for Facebook and third-party
app developers. We believe that any potential harms
from our study are outweighed by the concrete benefits
to Facebook and the general public. To foster follow up
research on privacy issues of third-party apps on online
social networks, the code and data of CanaryTrap is
available at github.com/shehrozef/CanaryTrap/.
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